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ABSTRACT
Spam, also known as Unsolicited Commercial Email (UCE),
is the bane of email communication. Many data mining
researchers have addressed the problem of detecting spam,
generally by treating it as a static text classification prob-
lem. True in vivo spam filtering has characteristics that
make it a rich and challenging domain for data mining. In-
deed, real-world datasets with these characteristics are typ-
ically difficult to acquire and to share. This paper demon-
strates some of these characteristics and argues that re-
searchers should pursue in vivo spam filtering as an accessi-
ble domain for investigating them.
General Terms
spam, text classification, challenge problems, class skew, im-
balanced data, cost-sensitive learning, data streams, concept
drift
1. INTRODUCTION
Spam, also known as Unsolicited Commercial Email (UCE)
and Unsolicited Bulk Email (UBE), is commonplace every-
where in email communication1. Spam is a costly problem
and many experts agree it is only getting worse [7; 24; 31; 34;
14]. Because of the economics of spam and the difficulties
inherent in stopping it, it is unlikely to go away soon.
Many data mining and machine learning researchers have
worked on spam detection and filtering, commonly treat-
ing it as a basic text classification problem. The problem
is popular enough that it has been the subject of a Data
Mining Cup contest [10] as well as numerous class projects.
Bayesian analysis has been very popular [28; 30; 16; 3], but
researchers have also used SVMs [20], decisions trees [4],
memory and case-based reasoning [29; 8], rule learning [27]
and even genetic programming [19].
But researchers who treat spam filtering as an isolated text
classification task have only addressed a portion of the prob-
lem. This paper argues that real-world in vivo spam filtering
is a rich and challenging problem for data mining. By “in
1The term “spam” is sometimes used loosely to mean any
message broadcast to multiple senders (regardless of intent)
or any message that is undesired. Here we intend the nar-
rower, stricter definition: unsolicited commercial email sent
to an account by a person unacquainted with the recipient.
vivo” we mean the problem as it is truly faced in an op-
erating environment, that is, by an on-line filter on a mail
account that receives realistic feeds of email over time, and
serves a human user. In this context, spam filtering faces
issues of skewed and changing class distributions; unequal
and uncertain error costs; complex text patterns; a complex,
disjunctive and drifting target concept; and challenges of
intelligent, adaptive adversaries. Many real-world domains
share these characteristics and would benefit indirectly by
work on spam filtering.
Improving spam filtering is a worthy goal in itself, but this
paper takes the (admittedly selfish) position that data min-
ing researchers should study the problem for the benefit
of data mining. It is unclear whether spam filtering ef-
forts could genuinely benefit from data mining research. On
the other hand, one of the persistent difficulties of research
in many real-world domains is that of acquiring and shar-
ing datasets. Most companies, for example, do not release
customer transaction data; we are aware of no public do-
main datasets containing genuine fraudulent transactions for
studying fraud detection. Even sharing such data between
partner companies usually requires formal non-disclosure
agreements. In other domains datasets may still have copy-
right or privacy issues. Few datasets involving concept drift
or changing class distributions are publicly available. With-
out such datasets, the ability to replicate results and to
compare algorithm performance is hindered and progress on
these research topics will be impaired. Spam data are easily
accessible and shareable, which makes spam filtering a good
domain testbed for investigating many of the same issues.
The remainder of the paper enumerates these research issues
and describes how they are manifested in in vivo spam filter-
ing. The final section of the paper discusses how researchers
could begin exploring the domain.
2. CHALLENGES
2.1 Skewed and drifting class distributions
Like most text classification domains, spam presents the
problem of a skewed class distribution, i.e., the proportion of
spam to legitimate email is uneven. There are no generally
agreed upon class priors for this problem. Go´mez Hidalgo
[15] points out that the proportion of spam messages re-
ported in research datasets varies considerably, from 16.6%
to 88.2%. This may be simply because the proportion varies
considerably from one individual to another. The amount
of spam received depends on the email address, the degree
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(a) Spam messages (b) Legitimate messages
Figure 1: Weekly variation in message traffic, spam versus legitimate email
Figure 2: SpamCop: Spam forwarded and reports sent
of exposure, the amount of time the address has been pub-
lic and the upstream filtering. The amount of legitimate
email received similarly varies greatly from one individual
to another.
Perhaps more importantly, spam varies over time as well.
This was demonstrated dramatically in 2002 when a large
number of open relays and open proxies were brought on-line
in Asian countries, primarily Korea and China. Such a large
new pool of unprotected machines provided great opportu-
nities for spammers, and soon email servers throughout the
world experienced a huge surge in the amount of spam they
forwarded and received. The problem became so bad that
for a brief time all email from certain Asian countries was
blocked completely by some ISPs [9].
In spite of claims that spam is generally increasing [7; 24;
5], the volume varies considerably and non-monotonically
on a daily or weekly scale. Calculating spam proportion
even approximately is difficult. Although some public spam
datasets are available (see Appendix A), we are aware of no
personal email datasets arranged over time, so it is difficult
to match the two to establish priors. Nevertheless, using
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Figure 3: Drifting priors: weekly estimates of p(spam) taken
from data in figure 1.
several datasets we can make a case that spam priors change
significantly over time.
Figure 1a shows a graph of spam volume received in 2002
by Paul Wouters of Xtended Internet2. In 2002 the spam
volume was 146± 55 messages per week, indicating a great
deal of variation in spite of its upward trend. For most
people, the volume of the legitimate email received varies as
well. Figure 1b shows a graph of the number of legitimate
messages saved by the author over the weeks in 2002. The
volume is 12.3± 6.4 messages per week.
Figure 2 shows the volume of reports issued from Spam-
Cop’s website3 This graph also demonstrates some of spam’s
episodic nature. SpamCop is a service used by many peo-
ple to filter spam and to submit reports (complaints) to the
originators of spam. Both the amount of spam submitted
and the number of reports sent show clear episodic behavior.
These graphs show time variation in both the volume of
2http://spamarchive.xtdnet.nl/
3http://www.spamcop.net/spamstats.shtml
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Figure 4: Email volume from Eide’s trial, (a) absolute volume, (b) resulting prior p(spam).
spam and the volume of legitimate email received, something
that researchers have not generally acknowledged. Since the
two sources of email—senders of spam and senders of legiti-
mate email—are independent parties with little in common,
we can expect their variation to be statistically uncorrelated,
and the class priors will vary over time. No fixed prior will
be correct.
How much could we expect class priors to vary? If we assume
that a user received the spam shown in figure 1a and the
legitimate email shown in figure 1b, we can estimate the class
prior p(spam) simply as the proportion of weekly messages
that are spam. Figure 3 shows a graph of this value, which
ranges between about .67 to .99.
A further demonstration of changing priors appears in Kris-
tian Eide’s study of bayesian spam filters [12]. In evaluating
these filters he measured the volume of spam and legitimate
email he received over the course of one month. These vol-
umes are graphed in figure 4a, and the computed daily spam
prior is graphed in figure 4b. The prior ranges from .32 to
.9, showing greater variation than in figure 3, though the
skew is not as high.
Variation in class priors may be problematic for researchers
because it makes solution superiority more difficult to es-
tablish. A classifier that performs better than another on
a dataset with 80% spam may perform worse on one with
40% spam [26].
Should researchers be concerned about these varying class
priors? This question is difficult to answer conclusively be-
cause it depends on classifier performance as well as error
cost assumptions (discussed in section 2.2). But by employ-
ing the cost curve framework of Drummond and Holte [11],
we can answer a related question, How much of cost space is
influenced by this variation? This question can be answered
by calculating the span of the Probability Cost Function
(PCF), which is the x axis of a cost curve. The PCF ranges
from zero to one and is a function of the class prevalence
and the ratio of misclassification error costs. In the case of
spam:
PCFspam =
p(spam) · cost(FN)
p(spam) · cost(FN) + p(legit) · cost(FP )
If we assume that the cost of a false positive (that is, of
classifying a legitimate message as spam) is about ten times
that of a false negative, this reduces to
PCFspam =
p(spam)
p(spam) + p(legit)× 10
Using the p(spam) range from figure 4b, the PCF range of
interest for spam filtering is .04 ≤ PCFspam ≤ .47. Since the
entire PCF range is [0,1], this means nearly half of cost space
is influenced by this variation in priors. Any classifier whose
performance lies within this 44% could be a competitive
solution. This is a wide range, and it is reasonable to expect
classifier superiority to vary within it.
The purpose of this analysis is not to call into question the
validity of prior work, but to point out that changing class
distributions are a reality in this domain and their influence
on solutions should be tested. Conversely, researchers in-
vestigating skewed and varying class distributions would do
well to study the spam filtering problem.
Exactly how a researcher should best track and adjust class
priors is an open question and will require research. Time
series work in statistics should provide some strategies, for
example, using an exponentially decayed average of recent
priors. However researchers estimate priors, they should ac-
knowledge that priors vary and static values are unrealistic.
2.2 Unequal and uncertain error costs
A further complication of in vivo filtering is the asymmetry
of error costs. Viewing the filter as a spam classifier, a spam
message is a positive instance and a legitimate message is
a negative instance. Judging a legitimate email to be spam
(a false positive error) is usually far worse than judging a
spam email to be legitimate (a false negative error). A false
negative simply causes slight irritation, i.e., the user sees
an undesirable message. A false positive can be critical.
If spam is deleted permanently from a mail server, a false
positive can be very expensive since it means a (possibly
important) message has been discarded without a trace. If
spam is moved to a low-priority mail folder for later human
scanning, or if the address is only used to receive low priority
email, false positives may be much more tolerable.
In an essay on developing a bayesian spam filter, Paul Gra-
ham [16] describes the different errors in an insightful com-
ment:
False positives seem to me a different kind of er-
ror from false negatives. Filtering rate is a mea-
sure of performance. False positives I consider
more like bugs. I approach improving the fil-
tering rate as optimization, and decreasing false
positives as debugging.
Ken Schneider, CTO of the mail filtering company Bright-
Mail, makes the same point more starkly [31]. He argues
that filtering even a small amount of legitimate email de-
feats the purpose of filtering because it forces the user to
start reviewing the spam folder for missed messages. Even a
single missed important message may cause a user to recon-
sider the value of spam filtering. This argues for assigning
a very high cost to false positive errors.
Regardless of the exact values, these asymmetric error costs
must be acknowledged and taken into account by any ac-
ceptable filtering solution. Judging a spam filtering system
by accuracy (or, equivalently, error rate) is unrealistic and
misleading [26]. Some researchers have measured precision
and recall without questioning whether metrics for informa-
tion retrieval are appropriate for a filtering task.
Fortunately, most researchers have acknowledged these asym-
metric costs, but methods for dealing with them have been
ad hoc. The 2003 Data Mining Cup Competition [10] re-
quired that learned classifiers have no more than a 1% false
positive rate, but the organizers gave no justification for
this cut-off. Graham [16] simply double-counted the tokens
of his legitimate email, essentially considering the cost of a
false positive to be twice that of a false negative. Sahami
et al. [28] used a very high probability threshold of .999 for
classifying a message as spam. Androutsopoulos et al. [2]
performed more careful experiments across cost ratios of 1,
10 and 100, exploring two orders of magnitude of cost ratios.
These approaches suggest a deeper issue: true costs of fil-
tering errors may simply be unknown to the data mining
researcher, or may be known only approximately. Only the
end user will know the consequences of filtering mistakes
and be able to estimate error tradeoffs. In vivo filtering
requires flexibility of solutions: the user should be able to
specify the approximate costs (or relative severity) of the
errors and the run-time filter should accommodate. Admit-
tedly this requirement complicates research evaluation since
the superiority of an approach may not extend throughout
a cost range, and multiple experiments may have to be per-
formed.
Such uncertainty is actually common in real-world domains,
where experts may have difficulty stating the exact cost of
an erroneous action, or the cost of the action may vary de-
pending on external circumstances. This situation moti-
vated development of a framework based on ROC analysis
for evaluating and managing classifiers when error costs are
uncertain [25]. In the case of spam filtering, the uncertainty
of error costs may not change temporally but they do vary
between users. Go´mez Hidalgo [15] used this framework
for developing and evaluating spam filtering solutions, and
found it useful. Drummond and Holte [11] have also devel-
oped a cost curve framework that extends ROC analysis and
serves much the same purpose. Whatever technique is used
for evaluating classifier performance, researchers should be
prepared to demonstrate a solution’s performance over a
range of costs.
2.3 Disjunctive and changing target concept
Section 2.1 made the case that the amount of spam drifts
over time, so class distributions vary. It is also true that
the content of spam changes over time, so class-conditioned
feature probabilities will change as well.
Some spam topics are perpetual, such as advertisements
for pornography sites, offers for mortgage re-financing, and
moneymaking schemes. Other topics are bursty or occur in
epidemics.
One notorious example of a spam ploy coming into vogue is
the “Nigerian Money” scam, a get-rich-quick scam in which
help was solicited to transfer money from a Nigerian bank
account [32]. The details varied, but the sender usually
claimed to be responsible for a large bank account and re-
quested assistance in “liberating” the funds from the Nige-
rian government. The sender was willing to pay generously
for access to a foreign bank account into which the money
would be transfered. This account was usually drained of
funds once access was granted. Eventually the people re-
sponsible for the scam were arrested, and spam of that type
declined quickly (unfortunately, variants continue to circu-
late as other people adopt the general idea). Prior to this
scam, keywords such as nigeria and assistance were not
strong predictors of spam.
A more dramatic episode occurred in April of 2003 when
decks of playing cards depicting “Iraq’s Most Wanted” were
made available for sale. These cards were advertised pri-
marily via spam. The advertising campaign created such a
spam blizzard that its story—and the campaign’s success —
were written up in the New York Times [18]. This campaign
abated quickly and few of the terms uniquely associated with
this episode retain much predictive power now.
The point for researchers is that spam content changes so
the “spam” concept should drift inevitably. Some compo-
nents (disjuncts) of the concept description should remain
constant or change only slowly. Others will spike during
epidemics, as specific scams or merchandising schemes come
into vogue. Even perpetual topics do not exhibit constant
term frequencies.
It is difficult to estimate how much we can expect “spam”
as a concept to drift over time, in part because no metric
of concept drift has been adopted by the community. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to present a rigorous investi-
gation of concept drift in spam, but a simple technique can
demonstrate significant word frequency variation.
Swan and Allan [33] employed a χ2 test to discover “bursty”
topics in daily news stories. Their test was designed to deter-
mine whether the appearance of a term on a given day was
statistically significant. This test can be applied to weekly
groups of spam messages in Wouters’ archive, using the av-
erage weekly frequency of a term as its expected value. The
results are shown in figure 5, with selected terms listed on
the left side and a column for every week (1–52) of 2002
extending to the right. The height of a bar at a term-week
is proportional to the term’s frequency in that week. The
special symbol “⊠” denotes a term burst: it appears in a
term’s row if that term appeared more than four times in
the week and the χ2 test succeeded at p < 0.01.
Figure 5 shows that spam has complex time-varying behav-
Week of 2002
1 10 20 30 40 50
0rgy ⊠⊠
accept ⊠⊠⊠
adult ⊠⊠⊠ ⊠
amateur ⊠
application ⊠ ⊠ ⊠⊠
assistance ⊠
awesome ⊠⊠
beneficiary ⊠
billionaire ⊠
cards ⊠⊠⊠
casino ⊠
checks ⊠⊠⊠ ⊠
christmas ⊠⊠ ⊠
click ⊠ ⊠ ⊠
debtfree ⊠
deposit ⊠
dirty ⊠⊠
fortune ⊠
free ⊠ ⊠ ⊠ ⊠ ⊠
girls ⊠⊠
horny ⊠
hot ⊠⊠
hottest ⊠
insurance ⊠
jenna ⊠⊠
lagos ⊠
lauren ⊠⊠
loan ⊠
merchant ⊠ ⊠⊠
mortgage ⊠ ⊠
nicki ⊠⊠
nigeria ⊠
pornstars ⊠
postmaster ⊠⊠
promotion ⊠⊠
removed ⊠ ⊠⊠ ⊠ ⊠⊠⊠ ⊠
viagra ⊠
videos ⊠
virus ⊠⊠
weight ⊠⊠
Figure 5: Frequency and burstiness of spam terms.
ior. Some terms recur intermittently, such as adult, click,
free, hot and removed. Others are episodic, e.g., the terms
common in a “Nigerian scam” burst in week 18 (nigeria, la-
gos, assistance, beneficiary) and terms in a “pornstar videos”
burst in weeks 31–32 (0rgy, awesome, pornstars, jenna, lau-
ren, nicki). The term christmas bursts late in the year and
presumably reappears every year around the same time.
Spam behavior is not simply a matter of one concept drifting
to another in succession, but instead is a superimposition of
constant, periodic and episodic phenomena. Researchers in
data mining have studied classification under concept drift
but it remains an open problem. Work in Topic Detection
and Tracking [1] is likely to be relevant to spam classifica-
tion, though technically it addresses a different problem. No
detailed study of real-world concept drift has yet been un-
dertaken, and to the best of our knowledge there are no stan-
dard datasets for studying it. A longitudinal spam dataset
would be an excellent testbed for investigating issues in con-
cept drift and stream classification.
2.4 Intelligent adaptive adversaries
The spam stream changes over time as different products
or scams, marketed by spam, come into vogue. There is a
separate reason for concept drift: spammers are engaged in
a perpetual “arms race” with email filters [7; 35].
Over time spammers have become increasingly sophisticated
in their techniques for evading filtering [23]. In its early days,
spam would have predictable subject lines like MAKE MONEY
FAST! and Refinance your mortgage. Messages would be
addressed to Undisclosed recipients or nobody. As ba-
sic header filtering became common in e-mail clients, these
obvious text markers were simple to filter upon so spam
could be discarded easily. As message body scanning be-
came common, fragments such as viagra and click here
could be checked for as well.
To circumvent simple filtering, spammers began to employ
content obscuring techniques such as inserting spurious punc-
tuation, using bogus HTML tags and adding HTML com-
ments in the middle of words. It is now common to see
fragments such as these:
• v.ia.g.ra
• 100% Mo|ney Back Guaran|tee!
• Our pro<br2sd9/>duct is doctor reco<br2sd9
/>mmen<br2sd9/>ded and made from 100%
natu<br2sd9/>ral ingre<br2sd9/>dients.
• C<!--7udzl53l5spp6-->lic<!--yajiwn1xnbecx2-->k
he<!--ehc0aj2pvwu-->re</a>
• Inc`re¨a¨se¨ te¨sto¨ste¨ro¨ne¨ by 254%
When rendered, these are recognizable to most people but
they foil simple word and phrase filtering. To counter this,
some filters remove embedded punctuation and bogus HTML
tags before scanning, and consider them to be additional ev-
idence that the message is spam.
Spammers are also aware that filters use bayesian word anal-
ysis and content hashing, so they often pepper their mes-
sages with common English words and nonsense words to
foil these techniques [23]. Messages are designed so these
words are discarded when the text is rendered, or are ren-
dered unobtrusively. Graham-Cumming [17] maintains an
extensive catalog of the techniques used by spammers to
confuse filters.
Whatever new filtering capabilities arise, it is just a mat-
ter of time before spammers find ways to evade them. In
machine learning terms, spammers have a strong interest in
making the “spam” and “legitimate” classes indistinguish-
able. Because the discrimination ability of spam filters im-
proves continually, the resulting concept drifts.
Because of this text distortion, in vivo spam filtering di-
verges significantly from most text classification and infor-
mation retrieval problems, where authors are not deliber-
ately trying to obfuscate content and defy indexing. Re-
searchers should expect that they will have to develop tech-
niques unknown in these related fields. Much of the effort
of developing spam filters will probably shift from feature
combining (i.e., experimenting with different induction al-
gorithms) to feature generation (i.e., devising automatic fea-
ture generation methods that can adapt to new distortion
patterns).
Such an arms race is not uncommon. Co-evolving abilities
appear often when access to a desired resource is simulta-
neously sought and blocked by intelligent, adaptive parties.
Fraud analysts observe criminals developing increasingly so-
phisticated techniques in response to security improvements
[13]. With spam, the desired resource is the attention of
email users, and spam may be seen as a way of illicitly gain-
ing access to it. Another example of an arms race occurs
in e-commerce. As pricing schemes have become more so-
phisticated, consumers have become more adept at gaming
the systems. Sophisticated “shop bots” have been devel-
oped, and on-line merchants have had to develop ways to
keep pricing information from them. Both sides continue to
improve their techniques. Finally, the well-publicized con-
flict between the music swapping networks and the Amer-
ican music industry shows characteristics of an arms race,
as both sides develop more sophisticated methods in their
battle over access to copyrighted material [21].
Such co-adaptation of intelligent agents is foreign to most
data mining researchers: the data are mined and the results
are deployed, but the data environment is not considered to
be an active entity that will react in turn. With the inter-
net, much information is freely and automatically available
by all parties, and interactivity is the rule. I propose that
the future will bring more scenarios involving feedback and
co-adaptation. Data miners may have to consider the effects
of mining on their task environment, and perhaps incorpo-
rate such concerns into the data mining process. Possible
strategies include concealing one’s deployed techniques from
adversaries, incorporating deception into techniques, or sim-
ply speeding up the deployment cycle to adapt more quickly
to adversaries’ moves. Spam filtering could be a useful do-
main in which to explore such strategies.
3. MEETING THE CHALLENGE
This paper has made the case that in vivo spam filtering can
be a complex data mining problem with difficult challenging
characteristics:
• Skewed and changing class distributions
• Unequal and uncertain error costs
• Complex text patterns requiring sophisticated parsing
• A disjunctive target concept comprising superimposed
phenomena with complex temporal characteristics
• Intelligent, adaptive adversaries
Researchers wishing to explore these issues would do well to
study in vivo spam filtering. Controlled laboratory datasets
exhibiting these characteristics are often difficult to acquire
and to share. Spam filtering, on the other hand, is an excel-
lent domain for investigating these problems.
Researchers wishing to pursue this domain should begin col-
lecting longitudinal data in a controlled manner. Spam is
notoriously easy to attract. Several studies have measured
the extent to which various activities attract spam [22; 6],
and this information may be useful. It is easy to create
ad hoc email addresses (for example, through Hotmail or
Yahoo) and to advertise them in a controlled manner to
attract spam. Such addresses are sometimes called “spam
traps” and are used by email filtering companies such as
BrightMail to obtain a continuous clean feed of spam for
analysis.
A more difficult problem is that of obtaining shareable cor-
pora of non-spam email, which often contain personal details
that people want to keep private. Two general approaches
have been taken:
1. Researchers who have contributed personal email have
sought ways to anonymize it. The contributors of the
UCI “spambase” dataset achieved this by reducing the
original messages to word frequencies and perform-
ing feature selection upon the set. Unfortunately, this
makes it difficult for other researchers to experiment
with alternative feature selection or text processing op-
erations on the data.
Androutsopoulos et al. [2] have developed a basic en-
coding technique for sharing data without compro-
mising privacy. Their software and several of their
datasets are available; see Appendix A.
2. Androutsopoulos et al. [3] have suggested using mes-
sages from websites and public mailing lists as prox-
ies for personal email. Their “Ling-spam” corpus uses
messages from the moderated Linguist list. Other re-
searchers have suggested that such messages may not
be representative of the email most people receive.
Whether this renders mailing list data ineffective for
exploring in vivo spam filtering remains to be studied.
However researchers decide to generate such corpora, they
should consider making their data publicly available.
This article has outlined the challenges of in vivo spam filter-
ing and explained how pursuing such challenges could help
data mining. It is hoped that this article stimulates interest
in the problem. The appendix and references should serve
as useful resources for researchers wishing to pursue it.
Acknowledgements
The opinions in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the policies or priorities of the Hewlett-
Packard Corporation.
I wish to thank Melissa McDowell for providing spam and
email feeds. Thanks to Rob Holte and Chris Drummond
for help on cost curves. Thanks to Julian Haight for his
continuing work on SpamCop and for allowing use of fig-
ure 2; thanks to Kristian Eide for providing the data in
figure 4; and thanks to Paul Wouters and the people at
SpamArchive.org for making their data publicly available.
Much open source software was used in preparing this paper.
I wish to thank the authors and maintainers of XEmacs,
LATEX, Grace, Perl and its many user-contributed packages,
and the Free Software Foundation’s GNU Project.
APPENDIX
A. SOURCES OF SPAM DATA
There are several sources of spam data on the internet,
though researchers should be aware of their limitations.
1. Several static databases have been used by the ma-
chine learning community. The UCI database “spam-
base”4 has a featurized version of spam and legitimate
email. Androutsopoulos et al. [3] have made avail-
able several of their corpora containing both spam and
personal email. All are available for download from
http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/skel/i-config/. Note
that messages in these databases are not reliably times-
tamped so they are not useful for measuring time-
varying aspects of spam.
2. Paul Wouters, of Extended Internet, has an extensive
archive of spam available at http://spamarchive.xtdnet.nl/ .
His archive covers several years. His messages from
2002 were used to produce figures 1a and 5.
3. Richard Jones of Annexia.Org has made a longitudinal
spam archive available at http://www.annexia.org/spam/index.msp .
4ftp://ftp.ics.uci.edu/pub/machine-learning-databases/spambase
Although his messages are carefully timestamped, note
his explanation about the large drop around mid-2002,
attributed to deleting a number of old mail accounts.
For this reason I avoided making inferences about spam
volume from his dataset.
4. SpamArchive.org is a “community resource used for
testing, developing, and benchmarking anti-spam tools.
The goal of this project is to provide a large repository
of spam that can be used by researchers and tool de-
velopers.” Current SpamArchive has over 200K spam
messages and receives about 5000 messages per day.
5. Bruce Guenter has a longitudinal database of spam
available at http://www.em.ca/~bruceg/spam/. See
the caveat below about measuring spam volume.
Note that these datasets are archives of spam saved over
time and were not designed to be controlled research datasets.
It is important to understand the limitations of measuring
spam volume from any of them. They are kept by owners
of entire sites rather than individual accounts so the spam
may be extracted from several mailboxes. The mailboxes
may include admin and webmaster, which are believed to
receive more spam than average. Some of these administra-
tors even use “spam trap” addresses deliberately to attract
spam. Finally, note that being active on Usenet or the web
can often get a user added to spamming lists—as can mak-
ing a spam archive available on the web. For all of these
reasons, these spam archives may contain more spam than
the average email user typically gets.
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